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INTRODUCTION
In neuroscience and psychology it has
become common to distinguish between
declarative and non-declarative forms of
learning (e.g., Squire and Zola, 1996). The
perspective (Squire, 2004, p. 173) that
declarative learning “refers to the capac-
ity for conscious recollection about facts
and events and is the kind of memory
that is impaired in amnesia and depen-
dent on structures in the medial tempo-
ral lobe” developed when it was observed
that patients with hippocampal damage
were able to learn and improve on “pro-
cedural” tasks, such as hand-eye coordi-
nation, without being able to remember
the specific learning episodes (e.g., Scoville
and Milner, 1957; Squire, 1992). Such evi-
dence led researchers (e.g., Moscovitch,
1995) to suggest that there are two separate
learning systems: one involved in declar-
ative, conscious, learning situated in the
Medial Temporal Lobe (MTL) comprising
the hippocampus, and another involved in
non-declarative, implicit, skill/habit learn-
ing involving the basal ganglia.
An interpretation of the roles of
the hippocampus and the basal gan-
glia in learning independent from the
declarative/non-declarative dichotomy
may allow understanding the role of
neural structures critical in learning
without relying on phenomenological
categories—difficult to examine from a
scientific perspective—such as awareness
and consciousness. The very nature of
what consciousness is in fact still hotly
debated (e.g., Morin, 2006) and ground-
ing an entire taxonomy of learning and
memory on consciousness-based criteria
might complicate, instead of simplifying,
scientific interpretations, and progress. An
alternative perspective to the declarative—
non-declarative distinction (e.g., Packard
and McGaugh, 1992; McDonald and
White, 1993) emphasizes the role of
the hippocampus in learning stimulus-
stimulus relations, and of the dorsal
striatum in acquiring stimulus-response
relations. Such perspective is consistent
with a recent review (Henke, 2010) sug-
gesting that neurobiological models of
learning based on consciousness might
not be adequate to describe the available
experimental evidence.
THE HIPPOCAMPUS AND
STIMULUS-STIMULUS RELATIONS
The interpretation that the hippocam-
pus is involved in learning arbitrary
stimulus-stimulus relations is supported
by the finding that amnestic patients
with MTL lesions are impaired in asso-
ciative recognition procedures compared
to item recognition (Giovanello et al.,
2003). Similarly, Henke et al. (1997)
described hippocampal and parahip-
pocampal activation during associative
learning but not during item learning.
Moreover recollecting behavior, defined
by neuroscientists and psychologists
in terms of the ability to describe the
unique contextual details about a remem-
bered episode (e.g., Wilding, 2000), and
considered to be an example of rapid
learning of arbitrary stimulus-stimulus
relationships, is also typically regarded
to be hippocampus-dependent (e.g.,
Yonelinas et al., 2005). The mnemonic
deficits observed in hippocampal patients
may therefore, be described as “losing
the ability to learn unique stimulus-
stimulus configurations,” including what
has been labeled as “episodic recollec-
tion,” as opposed to “losing declarative
memory.” The literature on episodic
learning is in fact grounded on the
idea that episodic learning is declarative
by definition (e.g., Eichenbaum, 2000),
but by redefining episodic learning as
rapid acquisition of a variety of arbitrary
stimulus-stimulus configurations—both
in the time and space domain—the
“problem” of consciousness becomes less
relevant.
Is there experimental evidence that
the hippocampus is involved in learn-
ing stimulus-stimulus associations regard-
less of “consciousness”? The idea that
hippocampus-mediated learning is inde-
pendent from degrees of consciousness
is supported by experiments showing
that the hippocampus is active dur-
ing stimulus-stimulus learning even when
stimulation occurs subliminally (i.e., when
the stimulus duration is very short—e.g.,
17ms—not allowing participants to dis-
criminate stimulus presentation; Henke
et al., 2003). This finding goes directly
against the interpretation that the hip-
pocampus is “specialized” in declarative
learning, suggesting instead that its func-
tion in learning is independent from
the participant’s “awareness.” Further con-
siderations inconsistent with the idea
that learning with awareness and learn-
ing without awareness constitute separate
processes come from the large amount
of evidence showing strengthening by
reinforcement of verbal responses (e.g.,
Gupta, 1976, 1990; Williams, 1977; Gupta
and Nagpal, 1978; Nagpal and Gupta,
1979; Gupta and Shukla, 1989; Jolliffe
and Nicholas, 2004). If language-mediated
learning is by definition declarative and
dissociable from skill/habit learning—
such as selection by reinforcement—why is
then language sensitive to reinforcement?
To answer this question it may be use-
ful to consider an interpretation (Donahoe
and Palmer, 1994) suggesting that if
the hippocampus is involved in selecting
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arbitrary stimulus-stimulus relationships,
it then should play an important role in
the acquisition of verbal responses because
verbal learning (from a stimulus equiva-
lence perspective; Sidman, 1994) implies
arbitrary relations and interchangeabil-
ity among several (e.g., written, auditory,
and visual) forms of stimulation. In other
words, verbal responses imply arbitrary
stimulus-stimulus associations. If this is
true, then it is to be expected that ver-
bal learning (typically described as a form
of explicit learning) cannot take place
without the hippocampus, which is what
happened to Henry Molaison (Scoville
and Milner, 1957) and other hippocampal
amnestic patients. Hippocampal organ-
isms are consequently expected to display
deficits in tests that rely on strength-
ening arbitrary stimulus-stimulus rela-
tions including verbal ones. Verbal learning,
however, according to this interpretation,
does not have a special status compared
to non-verbal learning. Verbal behavior
may then be sensitive to reinforcement
because MTL function is dependent on
neuromodulation (e.g., Gaffan, 2002) and
the hippocampus receives a specific input
to area CA1 from the Ventral Tegmental
Area (Gasbarri et al., 1994; Martig and
Mizumori, 2010), a region specifically sen-
sitive to reinforcing stimulation.
THE BASAL GANGLIA AND
STIMULUS-RESPONSE RELATIONS
When reinterpreting the role of the basal
ganglia in learning without using the cat-
egory of consciousness, a description of
their involvement in reinforcement learn-
ing mechanisms may provide a useful,
“phenomenology-free,” alternative. The
basal ganglia have in fact been previously
described (e.g., White, 1997) as involved
in reinforcement-mediated acquisition of
stimulus-response relations. For example,
experiments have shown that dorsal stria-
tum lesions impair a rat’s performance
in a win-stay task in a radial maze, in
which the rat needs to learn to approach
lit maze arms (McDonald and White,
1993). The light illuminating a specific
arm of the maze acquires therefore, a
discriminative function for approach-
ing behavior, and such acquisition is
critically dependent on the dorsal stria-
tum. Recent evidence (Featherstone and
McDonald, 2004) has moreover shown
that the dorsolateral striatum—but not
the dorsomedial striatum—appears to be
critically involved in stimulus-response
learning mediated by reinforcement.
Modulation by reinforcement is possible
because the basal ganglia are innervated
by dopaminergic pathways originating
from the Substantia Nigra and the Ventral
Tegmental Area (e.g., Graybiel, 1990) and
presentation of reinforcers determines a
release of dopamine thought to strengthen
synaptic connections between neurons co-
active at the moment of reinforcement
(e.g., Stein and Belluzzi, 1988, 1989). The
dopaminergic input to the dorsal striatum
activated at the moment of reinforcement
is therefore, according to this account,
responsible for the selection of a specific
stimulus-response relationship (i.e., acti-
vation of a similar sensory response in
the future will increase the likelihood of a
similar motor response).
COMMON SENSITIVITY TO
CONSEQUENCES
Interpretations of the roles in learn-
ing of the hippocampus and the
basal ganglia that do not rely on the
declarative non-declarative distinction
have therefore, already a clear role in
the literature. Moreover, recent evi-
dence suggests that consequence based
learning—also described as feedback
learning—historically considered to be
part of a non-declarative learning system
mediated by the basal ganglia and specifi-
cally the striatum, is also mediated by the
hippocampus (Foerde et al., 2013; see also
Ortu et al., 2013). Foerde et al. specifically
demonstrated experimentally how feed-
back learning—when feedback is delayed
(i.e., 7 s)—is dependent on the hippocam-
pus but not on the striatum. Relatedly,
Gaffan (2002) has described how the
excision of neuromodulatory pathways
afferent to temporal areas leads to a dense
form of amnesia, suggesting that environ-
mental feedback constitutes a necessary
requirement for MTL areas to function.
Since such neuromodulatory pathways
carry information about the reinforc-
ing/punishing/novelty value of current
environmental and proprioceptive stim-
ulation, it seems overall improbable that
“learning by observation” can occur with-
out constant feedback to areas involved
in learning about the “value” of incoming
stimulation. It appears therefore, that both
basal ganglia and hippocampus mediated
learning are dependent on “environmen-
tal” learning signals, i.e., both are involved
in forms of feedback learning, condi-
tional on the stimulation incoming from
currently experienced environments.
FURTHER OBSERVATIONS
Squire(1992, p. 210) has proposed that
non-declarative learning involves behav-
ioral change while declarative learning
involves recollection: “Whereas declara-
tive memory concerns recollection, non-
declarative memory concerns behavioral
change. In non-declarative memory, infor-
mation is acquired as changes within
specific perceptual or response systems,
independently of memory for the prior
encounters that led to behavioral change.”
The proposal that declarative learning
concerns recollection and non-declarative
learning concerns behavioral change is
problematic because it implies that rec-
ollection/remembering does not involve
behavioral change. The literature focus-
ing on recognition learning, however, sug-
gests quite the opposite: the occurrence
of recollection in recognition experiments
is typically validated by reliable behav-
ioral change in source accuracy tasks
(e.g., Wilding, 2000). We know with rea-
sonable confidence that participants are
remembering only when they are able to
describe contextual information relative to
a specific studied episode. The behavioral
measure therefore, validates the neural
correlate of remembering. For example, in
the case of Event Related Potentials (ERPs),
the Left Parietal Effect—considered to
index recollecting behavior—is validated
by behavioral results in source accuracy
tasks as its magnitude increases with
higher source accuracy scores (Wilding,
2000).
LIMITATIONS
As the current debate about theoretical
frameworks for characterizing neural
structures involved in learning progresses,
it is essential to highlight some of the
weaknesses of the perspective presented
here. One limitation of the fMRI evidence
described by Henke et al. (2003), show-
ing that the hippocampus is active during
stimulus-stimulus learning when stimu-
lation is presented subliminally, is that
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the detection of hippocampal activation
during subliminal associative learning
does not rule out the possibility of an
interaction among different brain areas.
The MTL structure may in fact not be
solely responsible for those instances of
stimulus-stimulus learning, and by impli-
cation its activation may constitute a
necessary but not sufficient prerequisite.
Consistently, there are cases of statistical
learning, often considered to be a case of
stimulus-stimulus learning, assessed in
patients with MTL lesions (e.g., Nissen
and Bullemer, 1987). Overall, it appears
therefore, probable that the hippocampus
acts in conjunction with other areas dur-
ing stimulus-stimulus learning. Similarly,
with regards to stimulus-response learn-
ing, even if the basal ganglia play a crucial
role in the selection of stimulus-response
relations it is important to note that other
structures such as the cerebellum and the
amygdala have also been implicated in this
form of learning (e.g., Baxter and Murray,
2002; Boyden et al., 2004) and their role
may be necessary for stimulus-response
learning to occur.
CONCLUSION
The traditional taxonomy that distin-
guishes between neural systems support-
ing declarative and non-declarative forms
of learning may be inadequate, as exper-
imental and theoretical work suggests
that other criteria may be more use-
ful in categorizing the role of neural
structures involved in learning such as
the hippocampus and the basal ganglia.
The hippocampus, traditionally consid-
ered to be the core of a declarative
learning system, can in fact be described
as involved in strengthening stimulus-
stimulus relations—even when stimuli are
presented subliminally. The basal ganglia,
historically described as fundamental in a
non-declarative learning system involved
in feedback based skill/habit learning, may
similarly be better understood as critical
in stimulus-response learning, regardless
of awareness or consciousness. Moreover,
both structures are sensitive to neu-
romodulation activated by environmen-
tal or proprioceptive stimulation. Clear
mechanisms describing the role of the
basal ganglia in stimulus-response bind-
ing and the hippocampus in stimulus-
stimulus binding have been described
and are entirely independent from clas-
sifications based on awareness and con-
sciousness. Overall, these interpretations
offer a “phenomenology free” account of
the involvement of brain structures in
learning and—by taking explicitly into
account how environmental changes trig-
ger neuromodulation involved in selecting
stimulus-stimulus and stimulus-response
relations—may also provide a selectionist
framework to understand neurobehavioral
adaptations.
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